Days Plus (CDP), a month-long outreach activity that distributes vitamin A capsules to preschool children and deworms children 6 months to 14 years old. Introduced initially as a temporary, interim strategy, CDP is now a decade old.
Introduction Uganda's Child Days Plus
Uganda's Ministry of Health began implementing its version of Child Health Days (CHDs), Child Days Plus (CDP), in 2004. Its 1-month rounds are usually held in May and November. CDP core services are vitamin A supplementation for children 6 to 59 months of age and deworming of children 1 to 14 years of age. Most districts also add some other services, most commonly selected immunizations.
Each level of the Ministry of Health's organizational structure has specific CDP responsibilities.* At the national level, CDP is coordinated by the central office of the Ministry of Health, which mobilizes funds; produces information, education, and communication materials; procures and distributes essential supplies; and conducts monitoring and supervision. The District Health Team, the critical managerial hub of CDP, prepares microplans and budgets, coordinates district partners, conducts social mobilization, and records coverage data. The health facilities-the core CDP implementing unit-provide CDP services to all children 6 months to 14 years of age in their catchment area.
During the course of the month-long campaign, CDP services are provided at Ministry of Health facilities and outreach sites, which include primary and nursery schools and community centers, as well as high-traffic outdoor areas, such as trading centers and markets. Most outreach posts are staffed by Ministry of Health personnel and volunteers for one or two days during the CDP month. Volunteers' activities include mobilizing the community to attend CDP on the planned outreach days, helping manage the crowd, registering beneficiaries, dispensing vitamin A and deworming tablets, and maintaining tally sheets.
Child Health Days
More than one-third of all countries in the world regularly implement campaign-style vitamin A supplementation [1] . Over most of the past decade, the 103 UNICEF-priority vitamin A supplementation countries have posted steadily rising coverage rates [2] . Many countries, especially in Africa, have transformed these campaigns into CHDs, large-scale, mass mobilizations undertaken twice annually to provide an integrated package of services, usually targeting preschool children. While the composition of the service package varies, all CHDs include vitamin A supplementation and most include anthelminths and some immunizations. The keys to CHD success have changed over time. Their initial success was owed largely to supply-related considerations; they were piggybacked onto immunization campaigns, which were popular, well funded, and well organized, and thus required considerably less planning, administration, and financing than they would have otherwise required. Over time, the high and sustained popularity of CHDs has been due to a demand consideration: the fact that they provide mothers with "one-stop shopping" for multiple services for all of their preschool children, thereby reducing households' direct and indirect costs of care. Although there have been no rigorous empirical analyses of this demand effect in low-and middle-income countries, there have been a number of natural experiments that provide plausible evidence of it [3] [4] [5] [6] .
When CHDs were first introduced, they were seen as a temporary measure, a vertical program intended to better ensure high coverage rates of essential services in countries with weak public health systems [3, 4] . Have they outlived their usefulness? Are they now impeding countries from introducing new, more effective, more cost-effective, or more "permanent" routine services? This paper presents a case study of Uganda's CHD to address these issues, assessing it primarily through the lens of a cost analysis. The goal is to better understand how CDP is implemented; the costs of each CDP activity; the adequacy of its budget; its cost structure, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness; and whether there is evidence of Ministry of Health staff "fatigue" due to CDP's extraordinary demands.
Methods
There is no cost-accounting system for CDP, and there is no system for identifying or tracking the types and quantities of many of the resources used to implement CDP. It was necessary, therefore, to develop estimates of these measures. This study is designed to provide a comprehensive accounting of all of the resources used to provide a round of CDP without regard for who pays. This is an economic analysis: it includes all financial expenditures on CDP but also takes into account inputs (personnel, transport, services, and materials) that are contributed in-kind (so-called "off-budget" items), as well as inputs-in particular personnelwhich are already paid for and thus do not require additional direct outlays to implement CDP.
No national data are maintained on the number of outreach sites or services delivered, other than vitamin A supplementation and deworming. The 59 health facilities surveyed as part of this study had a mean of 18 outreach sites, 11 primary schools, and 7 nonschool sites. The typical outreach post is staffed for one day by two persons. While usual Ministry of Health services continue to be provided throughout CDP, facility staff commonly spend 75% of their time working outside of their facility during CDP, taking scheduled rotations between the facility and outreach sites.
The methodology employed is activity-based costing (ABC) combined with an ingredients approach (ABC-I). The application of this methodology requires first defining the major activities involved in implementing CDP at each administrative or implementing level, and then identifying all of the inputs required to undertake each activity [5] . Working with staff from each level of the Ministry of Health, we identified 11 activities and subactivities that were regarded as the essential actions required to implement CDP. These 11 activities became the cost centers of ABC-I. With cost centers defined as activities, this methodology is ideal for examining the extent to which a program is consistently implemented. ABC provides a more complete accounting of the resources required by a program like CHD, which has many off-budget inputs and no cost-accounting system, than the more traditional, financial cost-accounting methodology.
A structured interview survey using precoded questionnaires was conducted to collect information with which to estimate the costs of each of the six primary CDP activities, four of which are subdivided into subactivities. The data were collected by a three-person team. The head of the team entered and cleaned the data, using IBM SPSS (version 18) and Microsoft Excel. The survey was indispensable for gathering information on the time input of different cadres of Ministry of Health staff at each level of the Ministry of Health, the number and time input of volunteers, and administrative level-specific budget and expenditure documents. Due to resource constraints, the survey was based on a purposive sample of 9 districts and 59 facilities. All 81 districts were stratified by their population of children 6 to 59 months of age (high, medium, and low). Within each stratum, districts were sorted according to their performance in the previous (April 2009) CDP round. One high-performing, one medium-performing, and one low-performing district were randomly selected from each stratum. The sample was selected to ensure geographic variability and to provide a look at how the hierarchical healthcare system functioned at the district level by taking a nested sample of units: within each district, the sample usually included one or more Health Centres at each of the three levels. The usual district-based sample included two Health Center-2s, four Health Center-3s, and two Health Center-4s. The study population included health workers and managers at the facility level, district health managers, and at the national level, the Ministry of Health, Uganda National Expanded Program for Immunization (UNEPI), UNICEF, and national medical stores managers. Data were obtained through direct interviews and review of budgets and cost expenditure records. The resource requirements of the most recently completed CDP round (April 2010) were estimated as the sum of valuated donated time together with expenditures on personnel, transport, services, supplies, and logistics. Cost data were aggregated to specific program activities considering the required inputs.
Personnel costs consist of wages and daily subsistence allowances. The costs of both salaried persons and CDP volunteers were estimated. Staff and volunteers were asked how much time they spent implementing each of the CDP activities. These times were combined with salary information to quantify personnel costs. The value of the time contributed by CDP volunteers was estimated by using a shadow wage (or opportunity cost) of comparable work in the community, the agricultural day wage. Ministry of Health policy calls for paying staff allowances only when they do outreach work for at least 6 hours away from their assigned facility. Volunteers are entitled to daily subsistence allowances only for lunch. Data on personnel expenses were obtained from the manager of the health facility and were based on the average salary and average per diem rates of the typical staff positions involved in the implementation.
The personnel cost incurred by implementing any CDP activity at a particular level of the program varied, depending on the number of persons involved, the level of effort, and the salary and daily subsistence allowances. Health personnel frequently were found to be paid less than official levels of daily subsistence allowances, and volunteers were frequently not provided a lunch allowance. In the analysis here, we explicitly identify and juxtapose these differential rates of compensation, referring to them as "costs incurred" (or resources used), which are estimated with the use of government-established compensation rates, and "costs paid, " which are our estimates of what was actually paid to Ministry of Health employees and volunteers. We regard the differential as an approximation of the CDP financing shortfall. In the survey, we asked the health facility managers to report both the actual level of personnel time and daily subsistence allowances that were paid, as well as the cost that was supposed to have been paid according to official guidelines if resources were fully available. Table 1 shows the two cost estimates for each activity carried out at the average health facility. Health facility staff were consistently undercompensated for their CDP work: in all health facility activities, the costs actually paid were less than the costs that "should have been paid" had Ministry of Health rules and regulations been followed. Exclusive of salaries in the case of Ministry of Health staff, staff participating in CDP and volunteers received only 56% of what they were entitled to for their CDP-related activities. The activity with the largest shortfall was outreach. It accounted for slightly more than two-thirds of the shortfall, followed by social mobilization with 22%. From our interviews, we believe that this is a root cause of why the level of effort given to these essential CDP activities is significantly less than expected, and less than what is necessary to achieve the targeted coverage rates. Undercompensation for outreach activities affects staff morale, provider satisfaction, and service quality and ultimately affects CDP performance and coverage.
Results

The consistency of CDP implementation: The program fidelity-cost nexus
The survey found wide variation in the way in which CDP is implemented. Of the six primary CDP activity-based cost centers we defined, only one-vitamin A supplementation-was conducted in all 59 of the surveyed health facilities. On average, only 63% of all facilities implemented each CDP activity (table 2) . The significant variation in the number and proportion of health facilities implementing the basic activities of a. Conditional refers to the fact that these figures include only those facilities reporting that they implemented the activity. b. This is the sum of the conditional averages, which is calculated over different combinations of facilities (only those implementing each activity). This figure is provided only to give the reader an idea of the relative order of magnitude of variations across facility types.
HC: Health Center all three facility types to obtain the total health facilitylevel costs of the district. Second, we estimated the CDP costs of a DHMT that were incurred while undertaking DHMT-level activities. Next, we developed an average DHMT cost per health facility from our survey data, and assuming the DHMTs' costs were directly related to the number of facilities they managed, we multiplied the average DHMT cost per facility by the number of facilities in the particular district in question. Then we estimated the costs of each of the 83 districts. The total cost of the CDP in a particular region was estimated as the sum of the costs of each of the districts in that region. Finally, the nationwide costs of the CDP were calculated as the sum of all of the districts' (or all of the regions') costs plus the national-level costs. Table 3 shows that the estimated total costs of the April 2010 CDP were UGX 4.5 billion, roughly US$2.24 million. The cost structure of CDP reflects the fundamental characteristics of the program: a primary healthcare program based on a few simple interventions that require only a few low-cost inputs. Most of the costs of CDP are due not to its input requirements, but rather to the delivery system-both in-facility and outreach-which, due to the structure and intensity of the campaign approach, requires that assigned staff be fully dedicated to the program on a day-by-day basis and often traveling on CDP (only) work during the course of the CDP month. Given the structure of the Ministry of Health (with 1,322 Health Center-2s, 748 Health Center-3s, 198 Health Center-4s, and 51 hospitals), most of the CDP staff are from Health Center-2s, followed by Health Center-3s, Health Center-4s, and finally hospitals. Operating the outreach sites also entails considerable transport costs. Given the nature of the interventions and the delivery system, most of the costs of the program are determined by the number of outreach sites, the number of days they each function, and the duration of the entire event. The costs of the service delivery sites-both in-facility and outreach sites-are fixed and do not change much with changing levels of children served, because the supplies and services costs constitute only 12% of the total costs.
With most of the costs of a facility and its outreach sites composed of personnel and other inputs that are largely independent of the number of children served, as the number of children seen at a health facility (or outreach site) increases, total costs increase but do so only very slowly. The only additional costs of treating one more child at a facility (or outreach site) are the costs of the vitamin A and albendazole the child receives, which total 43.8 UGX (US$0.022) constituting less than 1% of the total CDP costs of a Health Center-2. As the number of children treated increases, the relatively large fixed costs per facility are spread over more children and the average cost per child (a measure of program efficiency) falls. The number of children served, therefore, is not an important determinant of the total costs of CDP: the primary source of variation in total CDP costs is the number of facilities. Table 4 shows the coverage of the April 2010 round and disaggregates the target population by service provided and age of the child receiving the service. Recall that the eligibility ages of the two interventions vary but overlap. Children 12 to 59 months old are eligible for both services. If we assume that the children 12 to 59 months old who received vitamin A also received deworming and that the cost of delivering a vitamin A capsule is the same as the cost of delivering a deworming tablet, we can develop an estimate of the share of the total cost of CDP attributable to these two services.* Vitamin A supplementation accounts for 1.25 billion UGX (US$621,890) (27%) of total CDP costs and deworming for 3.36 billion UBX (US$1,671,642) (73%) (table 5).
*Although districts are free to provide services in addition to vitamin A and deworming during CDP, and many do, no data are collected on these services. Attributing all CDP costs to vitamin A and deworming, therefore, overestimates their costs. Subtracting the total cost of albendazole and the total cost of vitamin A from the total cost of CDP, and dividing by the number of children treated, provides an estimate of the base cost of treating a child, exclusive of medicines. Adding the specific cost of albendazole to treat one child, UGX 27.97 (US$0.014), to this base average cost of treating a child provides an estimate of the average cost of treating a child with albendazole (alone), UGX 446 (US$0.22). Similarly, adding the specific cost of vitamin A to treat one child, UGX 15.78 (US$0.01) to the base average cost of treating a child, provides an estimate of the average cost of treating a child with only vitamin A, UGX 431 (US$0.21) and the cost of treating a child with both is UGX 458 (US$0.23). Clearly, CDP has been transformed from its early days when it was primarily a vitamin A supplementation intervention.
How much is CDP underresourced? Estimating a general order of magnitude
Underresourcing a program is likely to have two related but distinct effects: the quality or intensity with which one or more activities are carried out is likely to be eroded, and over time, some of what were regarded as the program's core activities will be dropped entirely. We use two different methods to more closely examine these potential effects. Our assumption that the nonimplementation of core CDP activities is a reflection of inadequate resourcing is a simplification, and we recognize that there are other potential factors-e.g., low staff motivation or a lack of understanding about how the program was designed and was intended to be implemented-are likely to contribute to cutting activities and result in what we will refer to as a lack of fidelity, i.e., deviations in the way in which the program was designed and intended to be implemented. Our methodology, therefore, will overstate the magnitude of underresourcing of CDP. Still, it provides us with what we might consider a plausible upper estimate of the shortfall. We estimate the shortfall by substituting the conditional mean level of costs of the activity in question, at the level and health facility type in question, and subtract from it the unadjusted, sample-based estimates.* We refer to this as the program fidelity-based approach to estimating underresourcing. Table 6 is a counterpart to table 3. It presents the total costs of CDP with microplanning and social mobilization costs adjusted for nonimplementation based on *The "conditional" mean is calculated from the reported costs of only those health facilities or administrative levels reporting they had undertaken the activity in question. the assumption that facilities were budget-constrained and not able to implement microplanning and social mobilization. The differences in the figures in these two tables provide an estimate of the budgeting shortfall that is manifested in the nonimplementation of these activities in some facilities. We estimate the mean cost of the activities as the cost that was incurred by the facilities that undertake them, and use that amount to make our fidelity-based adjustment.
The program fidelity-based approach: Accounting for an activity not being implemented
The adjustment results in a 34% increase in total costs. Microplanning costs increase by 3.6 times and social mobilization costs by 2.7 times. The magnitude of these increases reflects their high rates of nonimplementation. The adjustment increases the facilities-level costs by 45% but does not affect either the district-or the national-level costs. The costs "actually paid" versus "should have been paid" approach
The discrepancies between what were and what should have been paid primarily result from two activities: outreach and social mobilization (see table 2 ). The total estimated cost that should have been paid for the April 2010 CDP comes to nearly UGX 6.5 billion (US$3,233,830), 40% more than the actual costs that were incurred. The brunt of this component of underfinancing is felt at the health-facilities level, where all of the CDP outreach and 96% of the CDP social mobilization costs are incurred.
An estimate of the total amount by which the April 2010 CDP round was underresourced Ministry of Health pyramidal structure, where most of the costs of CDP are incurred, are also the components that suffer the greatest underresourcing. Eighty-seven percent of total underresourcing occurs at either Health Center-2s or Health Center-3s. The activity that suffers the most (two-thirds) underresourcing is outreach, with social mobilization coming in a distant second with 18%. Table 8 contains the two measures of underresourcing and provides an estimate of the total, UGX 2.7 billion (US$1,343,283). Of the total, 69% is attributable to nonimplementation and 31% to underpayments of Ministry of Health staff and volunteers. Adding the estimated value of total underresourcing to the costs paid provides an estimate of the "full implementation" cost of CDP. Total underresourcing constitutes 37% of the "full implementation" cost. Covering the "full implementation" costs would require a 58% increase in the level of financing.
Estimating the impact and cost-effectiveness of CHD
Based on impact estimates from studies performed in other countries, we estimate that vitamin A deficiency annually accounts for the loss of 12,568 lives and 367,704 disability-adjusted life-years (DALYs) in Uganda, and that the vitamin A supplementation component of CHD (alone) annually saves 2,399 deaths and 70,201 DALYs. The CDP cost per life saved is 3,843,320 UGX (US$1,922), and the cost per DALY saved is 25,075 UGX (US$12.5). Moreover, as we have seen, CDP is no longer "simply" a vitamin A supplementation program: it has become foremost a deworming intervention. Although Alderman and colleagues [7] have shown that Uganda's CDP deworming is effective in promoting linear growth, there are no DALY [8, 9] .
Discussion and recommendations
Financial or resource allocation shortfalls require managers to adapt: initially by cutting some input (as opposed to an activity) that is not likely to immediately or directly impact the program's performance. If underresourcing is a recurrent problem, however, the means of adapting to it are likely to evolve. With growing numbers of rounds of nonpayment or less than full payment, the motivation of the program implementers-volunteers and staff alike-is likely to be undermined, which will eventually result in more routine or permanent adaptations, such as simply dropping some activities, including those that the CDP program protocol deems essential.
A first likely candidate to scale back or drop altogether is daily subsistence allowance support provided for microplanning. The April 2010 round was the 12th round of CDPs that long-tenured Ministry of Health staff participated in. Such experienced staff are likely to have regarded microplanning as less than essential; with "everyone" already knowing what to do, a second casualty of underbudgeting is likely to be microplanning. Although a one-time scaling back of microplanning might not have much impact on programmatic outcomes, over time, however, as Ministry of Health staff turn-over and the size and composition of the target population change, it is likely to sap the program's effectiveness.
This type of reasoned reaction is consistent with the patterns of nonimplementation shown in table 1. It reveals that the most common activities that are not implemented are CDP preparation activities-such as microplanning or a community social mobilization meeting. Over the course of the campaign's monthlong implementation, as implementation becomes increasingly crucial to CDP, implementation rates increase. For instance, in contrast to the low rates of implementation found for microplanning and a community social mobilization meeting, higher percentages of health facilities reported participation in supervision (81%), outreach visits to communities for CDP (100%), and compilation of CDP coverage reports (97%).
The CDP program is underresourced, as evidenced by the substantial variation between costs actually paid and those that should have been paid, as well as by the frequency with which the 11 basic CDP activities and subactivities are not implemented. The resourcing shortfall is substantial, and its current general order of magnitude was reported in our survey to have existed for the past several years. The resourcing shortfall was found to be a common problem at all types of health facilities. The shortfall has left Ministry of Health staff and CDP volunteers working with only partial compensation and demoralized. The resourcing shortfall has forced the CDP to rely to a significant extent on the "good will" and professional commitment of the front-line workers to implement the program. It has undermined how the program is implemented and rendered it vulnerable to disruption by less committed implementers, creating uncertainties in the minds of the implementers and the public alike about the significance and the nature of the program, compromising its quality and coverage, and jeopardizing its sustainability.
CDP addresses important needs and, despite its substandard performance, is very cost effective: it should be continued and strengthened. CDP should be relaunched both to mark a break with the past and to eliminate uncertainties about the Ministry of Health's commitment to the program. This initiative should be demonstrated by allocating additional resources to CDP, identifying a CDP line item in the district planning budget to clearly establish it as a routine service and encourage its being more carefully planned, and undertaking a systematic review of CDP with the aim of developing a consensus about the minimum uniform activities its implementation requires. The status quo-with recurrent and substantial underresourcing-may keep total costs relatively low, but it also keeps demand and coverage low, lowering the program's efficiency from what it would be if it were more adequately funded.
The strengths of this study include its use of activity-based costing, which enabled implemented and nonimplemented CDP activities to be distinguished, which, in turn, was essential to quantifying one of the two key indicators of underfinancing; and its being based on a staff interview survey, which was essential to being able to distinguish per diems owed from per diems paid, the second indicator used to investigate underfinancing. The major weakness of the study was its reliance on a purposive sample, which may have resulted in the introduction of some type of systematic bias. For example, the districts selected may have been relatively better or poorly funded. Efforts to detect such bias, however, were unsuccessful.
